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___________ 
 
O P I N I O N 
___________ 
                         
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
This appeal involves a matter of first impression for 
this Circuit – whether Section 5 of the Federal Arbitration Act 
(FAA) requires the appointment of a substitute arbitrator 
when the arbitrator designated by the parties is unavailable.  
Dell, Inc., appeals from the District of New Jersey‟s denial of 
Dell‟s Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Plaintiff‟s 
Claims.  Dell contends that the District Court erred in denying 
its motion to compel arbitration based on the District Court‟s 
belief that the arbitration provision was rendered 
unenforceable because it provided for the parties to arbitrate 
exclusively before a forum that was unavailable when Khan 
commenced suit.  The District Court also refused to appoint a 
substitute arbitrator, finding that it could not compel the 
parties to submit to an arbitral forum to which they had not 
agreed.   
 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
Dell designed, manufactured, and distributed the 600m 
computer from 2003 to 2006.  Khan purchased a Dell 600m 
computer in September 2004 for approximately $1,200.  
Khan purchased the computer online through Dell‟s website, 
www.Dell.com.  To complete the purchase, Khan was 
required to click a box stating “I AGREE to Dell‟s Terms and 
Conditions of Sale.”  Just beneath the box was a notice 
stating: 
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The Terms and Conditions of Sale 
contain very important 
information about your rights and 
obligations as well as limitations 
and exclusions that apply to you.  
They contain limitations of 
liability and warranty information.  
They also contain an agreement to 
resolve disputes through 
arbitration, rather than through 
litigation.  Please read them 
carefully. 
As Dell‟s notice indicated, its Terms and Conditions of Sale 
contained an arbitration provision that reads as follows: 
 
13. Binding Arbitration.  ANY 
CLAIM, DISPUTE, OR 
CONTROVERSY (WHETHER 
IN CONTRACT, TORT, OR 
OTHERWISE, WHETHER 
PREEXISTING, PRESENT OR 
FUTURE, AND INCLUDING 
STATUTORY, COMMON LAW, 
INTENTIONAL TORT AND 
EQUITABLE CLAIMS) 
BETWEEN CUSTOMER AND 
DELL, its agents, employees, 
principals, successors, assigns, 
affiliates (collectively for 
purposes of this paragraph, 
“Dell”) arising from or relating to 
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this Agreement, its interpretation, 
or the breach, termination or 
validity thereof, the relationships 
which result from this Agreement 
(including, to the full extent 
permitted by applicable law, 
relationships with third parties 
who are not signatories to this 
Agreement), Dell‟s advertising, or 
any related purchase SHALL BE 
RESOLVED EXCLUSIVELY 
AND FINALLY BY BINDING 
ARBITRATION 
ADMINISTERED BY THE 
NATIONAL ARBITRATION 
FORUM (NAF) under its Code of 
Procedure then in effect (available 
via the Internet at http://www.arb-
forum.com, or via telephone at 1-
800-474-2371).  The arbitration 
will be limited solely to the 
dispute or controversy between 
customer and Dell.  NEITHER 
CUSTOMER NOR DELL 
SHALL BE ENTITLED TO JOIN 
OR CONSOLIDATE CLAIMS 
BY OR AGAINST OTHER 
CUSTOMERS, OR ARBITRATE 
ANY CLAIM AS A 
REPRESENTATIVE OR CLASS 
ACTION OR IN A PRIVATE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CAPACITY.  This transaction 
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involves interstate commerce, and 
this provision shall be governed 
by the Federal Arbitration Act 9 
U.S.C. sec. 1-16 (FAA).  Any 
award of the arbitrators shall be 
final and binding on each of the 
parties . . . .  Information may be 
obtained and claims may be filed 
with the NAF at P.O. Box 50191, 
Minneapolis, MN 55405. 
 
 Rule 1 of the NAF‟s “Code and Procedure,” referred to 
in paragraph 13 above, provided that “[t]his Code shall be 
administered only by the National Arbitration Forum or by 
any entity or individual providing administrative services by 
agreement with the National Arbitration Forum.”  Also, as we 
can see in paragraph 13, the arbitration provision did not 
designate a replacement forum in the event that NAF was 
unavailable for any reason.  But, as we see, the Terms and 
Conditions did incorporate the Federal Arbitration Act.  
 
 In addition, the Terms and Conditions provided that 
Texas law would govern interpretation of the Agreement and 
of any sales.  The Terms and Conditions did not contain a 
severance provision and any alterations to the Terms and 
Conditions required the signature of both parties.    
 
 Khan alleged that his 600m suffered from design 
defects, causing his computer to overheat and thereby destroy 
the computer‟s motherboard.  Khan replaced the motherboard 
multiple times.  After the third replacement, Dell refused to 
issue another replacement, claiming the warranty had expired.  
The 600m allegedly suffered from other design defects, which 
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prevented it from being used in a manner consistent with 
Dell‟s marketing.   
 
 On July 24, 2009, Khan filed a putative consumer class 
action on behalf of himself and other similarly situated 
purchasers and lessees of defectively designed 600m 
computers sold from approximately 2003 through 2006.  
Khan asserted seven claims for (1) violations of the New 
Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, (2) breach of express warranty, 
(3) breach of implied warranty of merchantability or fitness 
for particular purpose, (4) fraud, (5) negligent 
misrepresentation, (6) breach of implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing, and (7) unjust enrichment.  At the time 
the lawsuit was filed, the NAF had been barred from 
conducting consumer arbitrations by Consent Judgment, 
which resolved litigation brought by the Attorney General of 
Minnesota.
1
  The Consent Judgment “barred [the NAF] from 
the business of arbitrating credit card and other consumer 
disputes and [ordered the NAF to] stop accepting any new 
consumer arbitrations or in any manner participate in the 
processing or administering of new consumer arbitrations.”  
This was the result of government investigations revealing 
that the NAF engaged in various deceptive practices that 
                                                 
1
 See generally “„Arbitration’ or ‘Arbitrary’:  The 
Misuse of Mandatory Arbitration to Collect Consumer Debts” 
Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Policy, Oversight and 
Government Reform Comm. 3-5 (2009) (statement of 
Minnesota Attorney General Lori Swanson), 
http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/Hearings/pdfs/2009
0722Swanson.pdf (recounting Minnesota Attorney General‟s 
findings). 
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disadvantaged consumers.   
 
According to Khan, such practices included: 
 
(1) representing to consumers 
and the public that it was 
neutral;  
 
(2)  convincing credit card 
companies and other 
creditors to include exclusive 
arbitration forum provisions 
in their contracts and making 
representations to such 
entities that it would favor 
the entities in the 
arbitrations; and 
 
(3)    identifying and appointing 
anti-consumer arbitrators 
and withholding referrals to 
arbitrators who decided 
cases against companies. 
 
Khan also alleged that the Minnesota investigations 
found that these practices encouraged some corporations to 
select the NAF as their arbitration forum because of this 
prospect of favorable results. However, although Khan 
suggested that Dell must have chosen the NAF based on its 
corporate-friendly disposition, the record does not show that 
Dell was aware of these practices at the time that it selected 
the NAF as the arbitral forum governing Khan‟s purchase or 
that Dell selected the NAF for any improper reason. 
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On October 2, 2009, Dell moved to compel arbitration, 
arguing that the arbitration provision was binding and 
covered all of Khan‟s claims.  Khan did not dispute that the 
Terms and Conditions governed the contract.  Khan did, 
however, assert that the arbitration provision was 
unenforceable because the NAF, which the arbitration 
provision designated as the arbitral forum, was no longer 
permitted to conduct consumer arbitrations.  Khan further 
contended that the NAF‟s designation was integral to the 
arbitration provision. He argued, for that reason, that, because 
the NAF could not perform its function, the arbitration 
provision in the Terms and Conditions should not be enforced 
and the parties should proceed to litigation.   
 
On August 18, 2010, the District Court denied Dell‟s 
motion to compel arbitration and stay claims.  See Khan v. 
Dell, Inc., No. 09-3703 (JAP), 2010 WL 3283529 (D.N.J. 
August 18, 2010).  After surveying the relevant case law, and 
acknowledging that “the Third Circuit has not spoken on the 
issue,” id. at *3, the District Court found that the clause in the 
Terms and Conditions – “SHALL BE RESOLVED 
EXCLUSIVELY AND FINALLY BY BINDING 
ARBITRATION AND ADMINISTERED BY THE 
NATIONAL ARBITRATION FORUM (NAF) under its 
Code of Procedure then in effect” – demonstrated “the 
parties‟ intent to arbitrate exclusively before a particular 
arbitrator, not simply an intent to arbitrate generally.”  Id. at 
*4.  The District Court noted that “[s]ome courts have held 
that § 5 [of] the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) provides a 
mechanism for the appointment of an arbitrator when a 
chosen arbitrator is unavailable”, id. at *2, but that the 
designation here of the NAF as the arbitrator was “integral” 
to the arbitration clause.  Id. (citing Carideo v. Dell, Inc., No. 
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C06-1772JLR, 2009 WL 3485933 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 26, 
2009), and Ranzy v. Extra Cash of Texas, Inc., No. H-09-
3334, 2010 WL 936471 (S.D. Tex. March 11, 2010)).  The 
court concluded that granting Dell‟s motion to compel and 
appointing a substitute arbitrator would improperly force the 
parties to “submit to an arbitration proceeding to which they 
have not agreed.”  Id. at 4. 
 
II.  JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A district court decides a motion to compel arbitration 
under the same standard it applies to a motion for summary 
judgment.  Par-Knit Mills, Inc. v. Stockbridge Fabrics Co., 
Ltd., 636 F.2d 51, 54 & n.9 (3d Cir. 1980).  “The party 
opposing arbitration is given the benefit of all reasonable 
doubts and inferences that may arise.”  Kaneff v. Delaware 
Title Loans, Inc., 587 F.3d 616, 620 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal 
quotations omitted).  We exercise plenary review of questions 
concerning the “validity and enforceability of an agreement to 
arbitrate.”  Edwards v. HOVENSA, LLC, 497 F.3d 355, 357 
(3d Cir. 2007).  Although we subject underlying factual 
matters to the clearly erroneous standard, id., the “legal 
question whether the [appellee] may be compelled to arbitrate 
[his] claims” is reviewed under the plenary standard.  Pritzker 
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110, 
1113 (3d Cir. 1993).       
   
III.  ANALYSIS  
In this appeal, we must determine whether the 
provision in the Terms and Conditions that the NAF be the 
arbitrator is exclusive to the NAF and is an integral part of the 
agreement between Dell and Khan, thus preventing the 
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appointment of a substitute arbitrator.  Because this is a 
question of arbitrability, it is governed by the FAA.  Puleo v. 
Chase Bank USA, N.A., 605 F.3d 172, 180 (3d Cir. 2010).  
Congress passed the FAA “in response to widespread judicial 
hostility to arbitration agreements.”  AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion, __ U.S. __, __, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011).  
The FAA reflects a “liberal federal policy favoring 
arbitration.” Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. 
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).   The Supreme Court has 
unequivocally stated “that questions of arbitrability must be 
addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy 
favoring arbitration.”  Id.  However, the FAA respects the 
“fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of 
contract,” Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, __ U.S. __, __, 
130 S. Ct. 2772, 2776 (2010), and that “arbitration „is a matter 
of consent, not coercion,‟” Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds 
Int’l Corp., __ U.S. __, __, 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1773 (2010) 
(quoting Volt Info. Sci., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford 
Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989)). 
 
 The particular problem presented in this case – the 
unavailability of the NAF – is  addressed in section 5 of the 
FAA, which provides a mechanism for substituting an 
arbitrator when the designated arbitrator is unavailable.
2
  See 
                                                 
2
 Section 5 provides: 
 If in the agreement provision be made for a method of 
naming or appointing an arbitrator or arbitrators or an umpire, 
such method shall be followed; but if no method be provided 
therein, or if a method be provided and any party thereto shall 
fail to avail himself of such method, or if for any other reason 
there shall be a lapse in the naming of an arbitrator, or 
arbitrators or umpire, or in filling a vacancy, then upon the 
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Brown v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 211 F.3d 1217, 1222 
(11th Cir. 2000) (“Where the chosen forum is unavailable . . . 
or has failed for some reason, § 5 applies and a substitute 
arbitrator may be named.”).  In determining the applicability 
of Section 5 of the FAA when an arbitrator is unavailable, 
courts have focused on whether the designation of the 
arbitrator was “integral” to the arbitration provision or was 
merely an ancillary consideration.  See, e.g., Reddam v. 
KPMG LLP, 457 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 2006), abrogated 
on other grounds by Atlantic Nat'l Trust LLC v. Mt. Hawley 
Ins. Co., 621 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2010); Brown, 211 F.3d at 
1222.  As the Eleventh Circuit has articulated the standard:  
“[o]nly if the choice of forum is an integral part of the 
agreement to arbitrate, rather than an „ancillary logistical 
concern,‟ will the failure of the chosen forum preclude 
arbitration.”  Id.  In other words, a court will decline to 
appoint a substitute arbitrator, as provided in the FAA, only if 
the parties‟ choice of forum is “so central to the arbitration 
agreement that the unavailability of that arbitrator [brings] the 
agreement to an end.”  Reddam, 457 F.3d at 1061.  In this 
light, the parties must have unambiguously expressed their 
intent not to arbitrate their disputes in the event that the 
designated arbitral forum is unavailable.   
 
 
                                                                                                             
application of either party to the controversy the court shall 
designate and appoint an arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire, as 
the case may require, who shall act under the said agreement 
with the same force and effect as if he or they had been 
specifically named therein; and unless otherwise provided in 
the agreement the arbitration shall be by a single arbitrator. 
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 According to Khan, this standard has been met because 
the Terms and Conditions designate the NAF as the exclusive 
arbitral forum, implying that disputes should not be arbitrated 
if the NAF is unavailable.  Khan relies on the contract 
language that states that all disputes “SHALL BE 
RESOLVED EXCLUSIVELY AND FINALLY BY 
BINDING ARBITRATION ADMINISTERED BY THE 
NATIONAL ARBITRATION FORUM.”   
 
 In our view, this language is ambiguous:  
“EXCLUSIVELY” could be read to modify “BINDING 
ARBITRATION,” “THE NATIONAL ARBITRATION 
FORUM,” or both.   
 
 Khan, however, points out that the NAF‟s rules are 
incorporated into the contract, and that these rules provide 
that all arbitrations must be conducted by the NAF or an 
entity having an agreement with it.  We conclude, however, 
that this requirement is also ambiguous as to what should 
happen in the event that the NAF is unavailable.  The NAF‟s 
rules provide that they shall be interpreted in a manner 
consistent with the FAA and that, if any portion of the NAF 
rules are found to be unenforceable, that portion shall be 
severed and the remainder of the rules shall continue to apply.   
 
 Our finding of ambiguity is confirmed by the 
conflicting interpretations of this language adopted by the 
courts that have considered it. 
 
 The court in Brown supports Dell‟s position that 
“exclusively” modifies “binding arbitration.”  The arbitration 
agreement in Brown was interpreted as demonstrating an 
intent to arbitrate that trumped the designation of a particular 
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arbitrator who was no longer available.  In Brown, a former 
ITT employee argued that the arbitration clause between the 
parties – which was virtually identical to the clause here – 
was void because the NAF had been dissolved.  Id. at 1220, 
1222.  The Eleventh Circuit found that the unavailability of 
the NAF did not destroy the arbitration clause because 
Section 5 of the FAA provided a mechanism for appointing a 
replacement arbitrator.  Id. at 1222.  The court did note the 
“integral” exception but found that there was no evidence 
supporting the employee‟s claim that the forum provision was 
integral to the arbitration clause.  Id.  
 
 Adler v. Dell, Inc., 2009 WL 4580739 (E.D. Mich. 
Dec. 3, 2009), also supports Dell‟s position.  The facts and 
arguments proffered in Adler are identical to those before us.  
After noting the “integral” exception, the Adler court 
articulated the presumption in favor of enforceability of 
Section 5 of the FAA as follows:  “when the arbitrator named 
in the arbitration agreement cannot or will not arbitrate the 
dispute, the court does not void the arbitration agreement.  
Instead, it appoints a different arbitrator, as provided in the 
Federal Arbitration Act.”  Id. at *2.  In addition, the Adler 
court found the clause “SHALL BE RESOLVED 
EXCLUSIVELY AND FINALLY BY BINDING 
ARBITRATION ADMINSTERED BY THE NATIONAL 
ARBITRATION FORUM” was ambiguous on the issue of 
whether the NAF‟s exclusive designation was integral to the 
provision or whether the intent to arbitrate superseded the 
NAF‟s designation.  Id.  The court concluded that the 
arbitration provision did not meet the standard that an 
arbitration provision will fail only when the designation of an 
arbitrator is “as important a consideration as the agreement 
itself.” Id. at *3. 
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 On the other hand, in Carideo v. Dell, Inc., No. C06-
1772JLR, 2009 WL 3485933 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 26, 2009), a 
case factually similar to this one, the plaintiff who had bought 
an allegedly defective Dell computer, brought suit against 
Dell.  Dell moved to compel arbitration, pursuant to the 
arbitration provision that designated the NAF as the arbitral 
forum.  Applying the Ninth Circuit‟s decision in Reddam, the 
court in Carideo held that the parties‟ selection of the NAF 
was integral to the arbitration agreement.  Carideo, 2009 WL 
3485933 at *4.  Because the court found that the selection of 
the NAF and of its rules was integral to the arbitration 
provision, it concluded that appointing a substitute arbitrator 
would be a wholesale revision of the arbitration agreement.  
Id. at *6.  In coming to its conclusion, however, the court 
stated that “[i]n general, the FAA provides that where the 
chosen arbitrator is unavailable, the court may appoint a 
substitute arbitrator.” Id. at *3 (emphasis added).  We do not 
agree with the language used by the Carideo court.  We note 
that Section 5 provides that in the case of an unavailable 
arbitrator, “upon the application of either party to the 
controversy the court shall designate and appoint an 
arbitrator.” 9 U.S.C. § 5 (emphasis added).  The difference 
between may and shall significant.  We do not find Carideo 
persuasive.     
 
 Although courts are divided on the issue, we conclude 
that the “liberal federal policy in favor of arbitration” 
counsels us to favor the Brown line of cases.  The language 
relied on by Khan is at best ambiguous as to whether the 
parties intended to have their disputes arbitrated in the event 
that NAF was unavailable for any reason.  Because of the 
ambiguity, it is not clear whether the designation of NAF is 
ancillary or is as important a consideration as the agreement 
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to arbitrate itself.  See Brown, 211 F.3d at 1222.  Therefore, 
we must resolve this ambiguity in favor of arbitration.  See 
Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc., 146 F.3d 175, 186 (3d Cir. 
1998), overruled on other grounds by Green Tree Fin. Corp. 
Al. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000). 
 
 We note moreover that the arbitration provision in the 
Terms and Conditions specifically incorporated the FAA, 9 
U.S.C. §§ 1-16, suggesting that, in the event of the NAF's 
unavailability, the FAA's procedures for addressing such a 
problem should apply.  Finally, we note the notice, provided 
to Khan when he accepted the Terms and Conditions, which 
stated that they “contain an agreement to resolve disputes 
through arbitration, rather than through litigation.”   
 
 Khan, however, argues that, even if the NAF‟s 
designation as the arbitral forum was not integral to the 
Terms and Conditions, Section 5 of the FAA nevertheless did 
not apply here because NAF‟s unavailability was not a 
“lapse” within the meaning of statute.  In support of this 
argument, Kahn cites In re Salomon Inc. S’holders’ 
Derivative Litig., 68 F.3d 554, 560 (2d Cir. 1995), a case in 
which the arbitral forum, the NYSE, had refused to arbitrate.  
Khan argues that the word “lapse” in Section 5 of the FAA 
means “a lapse in the naming of the arbitrator or in the filling 
of a vacancy on a panel of arbitrators or some other 
mechanical breakdown in the arbitrator selection process,” 
not the NYSE‟s refusal to arbitrate the dispute – or the NAF‟s 
unavailability to do so.   
 
 We find In re Salomon unpersuasive.  First, we do not 
see why the NAF‟s unavailability is not a “mechanical 
breakdown in the arbitrator selection process.”  Apparently, 
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the NAF‟s Consent Judgment with the State of Minnesota 
prevents it from acting as an arbitrator.  This unavailability 
appears to us to be a breakdown in the mechanics of the 
appointment process.  To take a narrower construction of 
Section 5 would be inconsistent with the “liberal federal 
policy in favor of arbitration” articulated in the FAA.   
 
We conclude therefore that the unavailability of NAF 
to hear the disputes between Khan and Dell constitutes a 
“lapse” within the meaning of Section 5.3  
 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
The contract‟s language does not indicate the parties‟ 
unambiguous intent not to arbitrate their disputes if NAF is 
unavailable.  Section 5 of the FAA requires a court to address 
such unavailability by appointing a substitute arbitrator.  The 
District Court‟s contrary conclusion is at odds with the 
fundamental presumption in favor of arbitration.  We will 
therefore vacate the judgment of the District Court and 
remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.  
                                                 
3
  Because the District Court denied Dell‟s motion to 
compel arbitration, it did not address Khan‟s alternative 
argument that the arbitration  provision in the contract is 
unconscionable.   We leave it to the District Court to address 
this argument on remand. 
1 
 
Raheel Ahmad Khan v. Dell, Inc., No. 10-3655 
 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
 The majority opinion acknowledges that the Supreme 
Court has stated the “fundamental principle that arbitration is 
a matter of contract,” Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 
____ U.S. ____, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2776 (2010).  Indeed it has 
so stated more than once.  I dissent because the majority has 
given mere lip service to this “fundamental principle,” and its 
holding as applied in this particular case violates that 
principle.  There is no ambiguity in the arbitration agreement.  
  
The plain text of the arbitration agreement clearly 
states that the selection by Dell of the NAF as arbitrator was 
integral to the agreement, and leads me to conclude that 
Section 5 of the FAA is inapplicable and the unavailability of 
the NAF precludes arbitration. 
 
 The arbitration clause in Dell’s Terms and Conditions 
of Sale states: 
 
13. Binding Arbitration.  ANY CLAIM, DISPUTE, 
OR CONTROVERSY (WHETHER IN 
CONTRACT, TORT, OR OTHERWISE, 
WHETHER PREEXISTING, PRESENT OR 
FUTURE, AND INCLUDING STATUTORY, 
COMMON LAW, INTENTIONAL TORT AND 
EQUITABLE CLAIMS) BETWEEN CUSTOMER 
AND DELL, its agents, employees, principals, 
successors, assigns, affiliates, (collectively for 
purposes of this paragraph, “Dell”) arising from or 
relating to this Agreement, its interpretation, or the 
breach, termination or validity thereof, the 
relationships which resulted from this Agreement 
(including, to the full extent permitted by applicable 
law, relationship with third parties who are not 
signatories to this Agreement), Dell’s advertising, or 
any related purchase SHALL BE RESOLVED 
EXCLUSIVELY AND FINALLY BY BINDING 
ARBITRATION ADMINISTERED BY THE 
NATIONAL ARBITRATION FORUM (NAF) under 
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its Code of Procedure then in effect (available via the 
Internet at http://www.arb-forum.com, or via 
telephone at 1-800-474-2371).  The arbitration shall 
be limited solely to the dispute or controversy 
between customer and Dell.  NEITHER 
CUSTOMER NOR DELL SHALL CONSOLIDATE 
CLAIMS BY OR AGAINST OTHER 
CUSTOMERS, OR ARBITRATE ANY CLAIM AS 
A REPRESENTATIVE OR CLASS ACTION OR 
IN A PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CAPACITY.  This transaction involves interstate 
commerce, and this provision shall be governed by 
the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. sec. 1-16 
(FAA).  Any award of the arbitrator shall be final 
and binding on both of the parties . . . .  Information 
may be obtained and claims may be filed with the 
NAF at P.O. Box 50191, Minneapolis, MN 55404. 
 
App. at A67. 
 
The majority reasons that this language is 
“ambiguous” because “‘EXCLUSIVELY’ could be read to 
modify ‘BINDING ARBITRATION,’ ‘THE NATIONAL 
ARBITRATION FORUM,’ or both,” see Majority Opinion 
supra page 13, and that the “liberal federal policy in favor of 
arbitration” thus compels the court to resolve this 
“ambiguity” in favor of arbitration.  See Majority Opinion 
supra page 15.  However, “the FAA’s proarbitration policy 
does not operate without regard to the wishes of the 
contracting parties.”  Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman 
Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57 (1995).  The majority’s 
conclusion focuses solely on the language used rather than 
giving appropriate weight to the additional clues that 
demonstrate the parties’ clear intent.   
 
 The phrase “EXCLUSIVELY AND FINALLY BY 
BINDING ARBITRATION ADMINISTRATED BY THE 
NATIONAL ARBITRATION FORUM” is written in all 
capital letters yet surrounded by clauses written in lower case 
letters.  This aesthetic prominence indicates the parties’ intent 
for the entire phrase to be read together and emphasized as an 
essential part of the agreement.  Moreover, as noted by the 
District Court, “[t]he NAF is expressly named, the NAF’s 
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rules are to apply, . . . no provision is made for an alternate 
arbitrator [, and the] language used is mandatory, not 
permissive.”  App. at  A12.  The agreement also states that 
“[i]nformation may be obtained and claims may be filed with 
the NAF at P.O. Box 50191, Minneapolis, MN 55404,” again 
illustrating the central role that NAF was intended to play in 
arbitrations pursuant to this agreement.   
 
 Given “the consensual nature of private dispute 
resolution,” courts must respect the principle that “parties are 
generally free to structure their arbitration agreements as they 
see fit.”  Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. 
Ct. 1758, 1774 (2010) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  Here, the parties agreed only to binding arbitration 
administered by the NAF.  Full analysis of the plain text of 
the agreement as a whole shows that the selection of the NAF 
as arbitrator was an integral part of the agreement to arbitrate.  
Therefore, Section 5 of the FAA is inapplicable and the 
unavailability of the NAF precludes arbitration.  I respectfully 
dissent. 
 
 There is yet another reason why Dell’s request to 
proceed via arbitration rather than trial should not be granted, 
and that reason applies to this defendant in this case.  The 
majority avoids any discussion of the underlying reason why 
arbitration by NAF is unavailable.  In an action pending in 
Minnesota, the Minnesota Attorney General made public the 
results of its year-long investigation that showed that NAF, 
far from being the neutral arbitration forum contemplated by 
Congress when it enacted the Federal Arbitration Act, 
represented to corporations that it would appoint anti-
consumer arbitrators and discontinue referrals to arbitrators 
who decided cases in favor of consumers.  See Amicus Curiae 
Br. at 8, 13-15; see also Arbitration or “Arbitrary”: The 
Misuse of Mandatory Arbitration to Collect Consumer Debts: 
Hearing Before the H. Domestic Policy Subcomm. of Comm. 
on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 111th Cong. (July 22, 2009). 
 
 Rather than disputing the allegations, NAF accepted a 
consent judgment that barred it from administering and 
participating in all consumer arbitrations.  See id. (testimony 
of Lori Swanson, Minnesota Attorney General, at 3) (“Under 
the Consent Judgment, [NAF] is barred from the business of 
4 
 
arbitrating credit card and other consumer disputes and must 
stop accepting any new consumer arbitrations or in any 
manner participate [sic] in the processing or administering of 
new consumer arbitrations.”); see also App. at A273-76.  It 
cannot be insignificant that Dell named NAF as the exclusive 
forum in its arbitration clauses.  It followed that the District 
Court refused Dell’s request to designate a substitute 
arbitrator.  It was certainly not error for the District Court in 
this case to deny substitution at the behest of Dell.  Even 
assuming that in the usual case, substitution of a neutral 
arbitrator would be an acceptable alternative, it is evident that 
this is not an ordinary case and we should affirm the District 
Court’s denial of Dell’s motion.  
